Author(s) Filipa do Carmo Almeida Santos Silva
Advisor(s) Joaquim Freitas Rocha
Synopsis With the present study it is intended to analyse the excessive deficit procedure in the context of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), considering its importance and role as an instrument for economic policies coordination in the European Union (EU) and its role in the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Our purpose is to address it from a legal perspective, focusing our attention on the adequacy rules parameter that densifies your existence and your frame of reference. The analysis starts by outlining the essential dimensions of the positive legal framework and the “state of the art” of the current coordination of financial policies under the EU’s economic governance agenda. It is intended to set the context of the adoption of the SGP, and therefore the excessive deficit procedure, in the process of economic integration set up by the creation of the EMU, which find its base in the sound and stable public finances principles. The focus will be on the major step the EMU represents in the integration of EU economies and the significant evolution of the SGP along with the EU’s economic governance rules. Taking into account that for the effective implementation of these principles the EU adopted several control mechanisms targeted at introducing austerity and discipline in national public budgets, the second part aims to, at first, analyse the SGP as a set of legal and financial rules designed to ensure that Member-States in the EU pursue budgetary discipline and, afterwards, its successive amendments in an effort to allow it to better fit with economic governance rules. In the third part of our study, we study the excessive deficit procedure following an in-depth understanding of its legal and conceptual content in relation to the EU law. Our approach seeks to identify its compatibilities and flaws whilst outlines possible solutions that have been continuously found since the SGP entered into force. Particular attention was paid to the judgment of the Court of 13 July 2004, Commission of the European Communities, v. Council of the European Union, (Case C – 27/ 04).
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